A few years ago, a Kansas police officer entered a local convenience store for a drink when an employee called to him about an unconscious woman on a bathroom floor. Although the officer did not know it at the time, the store had already called for an ambulance. The officer entered the small bathroom and saw an unknown woman on the floor, a hypodermic needle and a purse nearby. No one else was present. The woman appeared to be semi-conscious but she was unable to respond to the officer’s questions, including questions about her identity and what substance that she may have taken. The officer thought that if he could identify the woman that he might be able to run her name through dispatch and find whether she had a history of medical or drug abuse issues. The officer intended to provide that information to the then-arriving paramedics.
The officer decided to look inside of the purse for any form of identification. While looking, the officer found a sock. The officer felt an object inside the sock that, based upon his experience, he recognized as a drug smoking pipe. The officer told paramedics that they may well be dealing with a drug overdose.
The officer continued to look for identification in the purse and when it was found the officer immediately relayed the name to dispatch. He then opened the sock, finding a smoking pipe and “crystal-type meth crystals.” The searching officer provided the information and the purse to a second officer that had arrived with the ambulance crew. The second officer then went outside to give the woman’s name to paramedics who had by that time moved the woman to the ambulance in the parking lot. The entire incident took about seven minutes.
The woman was identified as Jessica Dixon, and based upon the search she was later charged in state court with possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Dixon complained to the trial judge that the search of her purse was illegal because the officer did not have her consent, did not have a search warrant, and that no exception to the warrant rule existed under the facts of her case. The trial court denied suppression finding that the search of the purse fell under the emergency aid exception to the warrant rule, that the discovery of the sock was inadvertent, and that the illegal nature of the items inside of the sock was immediately apparent to the experienced officer. Dixon was convicted and appealed. In January of this year, four years after the incident, a panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and held as follows.
Under both the federal and state Constitutions, warrantless searches and seizures by law enforcement officers are deemed unreasonable and invalid unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. The “emergency aid” exception applies when a law enforcement officer is aiding a person who is “seriously injured or imminently threatened with serious injury.” That warrant exception is usually associated with a warrantless entry into a home when officers are aware of a fight or otherwise are checking the welfare of a resident. However, the panel held that the exception would apply to Dixon’s situation too.
The Kansas Supreme Court has previously held that the emergency aid exception gives an officer only limited authority to “do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance and to provide that assistance.” So, there are two initial questions to be answered about whether the exception should apply. First, does the officer reasonably believe that a person is in need of immediate assistance? If the answer is yes, then officers should remember that the authority to search will immediately terminate once the officer confirms that no one needs assistance, or when the necessary assistance has been provided. All searches under the exception are required to be “reasonably tailored to an officer’s attempts to aid the victim.”
With all of that in mind, in this case the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Dixon was seriously injured because she was on the floor and was unresponsive to his questions. The manner and scope of the search was also reasonable: the officer had acted immediately to aid Dixon, not only in communicating with her but in confirming that paramedics were enroute. While waiting for the paramedics, the officer searched the purse for identification and other information that would have directly assisted the arriving medical personnel.
Dixon argued that once the paramedics were on scene that the officer should have stopped searching. But, the appeals panel said that there is no bright-line rule that law enforcement is no longer expected to be a part of the continuing medical aid. The public policy behind the emergency aid exception is the need to protect life, and that such protection sometimes outweighs a person’s right to privacy. So, looking into the purse for identification and inadvertently finding the sock was justified.
But, what about the later search of the sock itself? Was that secondary sock-search lawful too?
The panel said yes. During an otherwise lawful search [of the purse], officers who feel an object whose criminal nature is immediately apparent have probable cause to search that object under the “plain feel” doctrine.
Bottom Line: “The officer’s warrantless search of Dixon’s purse was intended to provide emergency aid by providing medical personnel information to properly render treatment to Dixon. [The officer] had an objectively reasonable belief that Dixon needed emergency assistance and the manner and scope of his search was objectively reasonable. Thus, the search was justified under the emergency aid exception [and the plain feel doctrine] and the district court did not err by denying Dixon’s motion to suppress evidence.”
For further research and understanding: Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993); State v. Dixon, No. 124,970, Kansas Court of Appeals, January 26, 2024 (unpublished); State v. Smith, 59 Kan.App.2d 28 (2020); State v. Neighbors, 299 Kan. 234 (2014)
